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Abstract
Our episodic memory stores what happened when and where in life. Episodic memory requires
the rapid formation and flexible retrieval of where things are located in space. Consciousness of
the encoding scene is considered crucial for episodic memory formation. Here, we question the
necessity of consciousness and hypothesize that humans can form unconscious episodic memories.
Participants were presented with subliminal scenes, that is, scenes invisible to the conscious mind.
The scenes displayed objects at certain locations for participants to form unconscious object-in-
space memories. Later, the same scenes were presented supraliminally, that is, visibly, for retrieval
testing. Scenes were presented absent the objects and rotated by 908–2708 in perspective to
assess the representational flexibility of unconsciously formed memories. During the test phase,
participants performed a forced-choice task that required them to place an object in one of two
highlighted scene locations and their eye movements were recorded. Evaluation of the eye track-
ing data revealed that participants remembered object locations unconsciously, irrespective of
changes in viewing perspective. This effect of gaze was related to correct placements of objects in
scenes, and an intuitive decision style was necessary for unconscious memories to influence inten-
tional behavior to a significant degree. We conclude that conscious perception is not mandatory
for spatial episodic memory formation.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Fleeting daily experiences are memorable due to episodic memory
(Tulving, 1972, 2002). Episodic memory enables us to encode on the
fly and to retain for the long-term what happened where and when in
life. The “what” and “where” components of episodic memory are
important because they permit us to keep track of changes in the envi-
ronment. If we misplace our mobile phone, we probably failed to form
or reactivate the memory of putting the phone in a certain place. The
neuro-cognitive computations that underlie episodic memory formation
are speed of encoding, association formation, and flexible memory rep-
resentation (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Henke, 2010; McClelland,
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Moses & Ryan, 2006; Norman &
O’Reilly, 2003; O’Reilly & Rudy, 2000; Treves & Rolls, 1994). A flexible
memory representation can be reactivated in retrieval situations that
diverge from the encoding situation, for example, when entering the
space where we left the phone from another direction. According to a
long-held view, there is a further characteristic believed requisite for
human episodic memory formation, namely conscious awareness of
the encoding situation (Gabrieli, 1998; Graf & Schacter, 1985; Mosco-
vitch, 1995, 2008; Schacter, 1998; Squire & Dede, 2015; Tulving,
2002). A major problem with this view is that it is exclusively based on
the results from encoding protocols that use stimulus materials avail-
able to conscious perception. The only way this view can be tested is
by having human subjects encode stimulus materials presented below
the threshold of conscious awareness (i.e., subliminally) or by having
unconscious subjects encode supraliminal stimulus material while
asleep, under anesthesia, or in coma. Here, we opted for a subliminal
stimulation protocol. Only few studies used subliminal stimulus presen-
tations to test for an unconscious formation of long-term memories.
The feasibility of subliminal single word encoding and later subliminal
recognition of the same words was demonstrated by (Chong, Husain, &
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Rosenthal, 2014). In addition, we have shown that the rapid subliminal
encoding and flexible representation of face–word and word–word
pairs is feasible and that the hippocampus is crucial for unconscious
relational encoding and retrieval (Duss, Oggier, Reber, & Henke, 2011;
Duss et al., 2014; Reber, Luechinger, Boesiger, & Henke, 2012). These
earlier protocols lacked the spatial component of episodic memory. In
fact, prominent theories propose that spatial processing is the most
fundamental property of episodic memory (Burgess, Maguire, &
O’Keefe, 2002; Maguire & Mullally, 2013; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978).
According to the cognitive map theory (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978), the
function of the hippocampus is to generate internal maps of the envi-
ronment, to represent places and objects and their relations to each
other in the multidimensional space in an allocentric manner. As such,
cognitive maps provide the basis for spatial memory and flexible navi-
gation, which in turn provides for the contextual details and represen-
tational flexibility of episodic memories (Burgess et al., 2002). Here, we
decided to test whether consciousness is mandatory for (a) rapid spatial
relational encoding of subliminal objects in scenes and (b) whether the
object-in-space representation is invariant to perspective change (allo-
centric representation). This design allows us to extend previous stud-
ies on rapid unconscious learning of flexible associations that were
confined to sensory and conceptual relations.
Participants were subliminally presented with a series of subliminal
3D scenes, equipped with peripheral landmarks for orientation and
objects located at specific locations. Following a silent 3 min encoding-
test interval, the subliminal scenes were presented supraliminally,
absent the critical objects and rotated in perspective by 08–2708.
Unconscious memory for object-in-space locations was evaluated with
two implicit tests: (1) free viewing of a test scene for 6 s subsequent to
presentation of a subliminal object cue, followed by (2) a forced-choice
location selection task for the critical (now supraliminally presented)
object. During the free viewing task, the eye tracking index of success-
ful reactivation of object-in-space associations was disproportionate
viewing of the location formerly occupied by the subliminal object cue.
Based on previous evidence of memory-guided disproportionate view-
ing (Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, & Cohen,
2007), we anticipated an early disproportionate viewing effect, that is,
within 500–750 ms of scene onset. For the location selection task, par-
ticipants were instructed to decide to which of two highlighted scene
locations the object would fit better, as intuitively as possible. Here,
the index of successful reactivation of object-in-space associations was
a disproportionate selection of the object’s former subliminal scene
location. We encouraged participants to rely on their “gut-feeling”
when making their decisions because conscious selection strategies
and intentional deliberation may affect accuracy of decision perform-
ance when memory traces are weak or implicit (Reber, Beeman, & Pal-
ler, 2013; Voss & Paller, 2010). However, data from a pilot study with
the same design showed that not all participants could adopt such an
intuitive decision strategy easily, and that a general preference for
deliberative decision making was negatively associated with perform-
ance on the forced-choice task (see Supporting Information). To
account for this, we assessed participant’s general decision making
preference before experimentation. We divided participants into two
groups, namely a group of intuitive decision makers and a group of
deliberative decision makers. Based on the findings of the mentioned
pilot experiment (Supporting Information), we expected to find in this
study expressions of unconscious object-location knowledge in the
choice behavior of intuitive decision makers.
For the free viewing task, we expected that eye movements in the
eye-movement-based implicit test would be sensitive to object-in-place
memory for all participants. Gaze might be a more sensitive measure of
unconscious memory than intentional button-press responses because
we move our eyes spontaneously in the presence of visual stimuli; con-
sequently, eye movements may be less susceptible to conscious selec-
tion strategies and intentional deliberation, particularly when participants
are simply instructed to viewmaterials that are being presented (Hannula
et al., 2010a; Hannula, Baym, Warren, & Cohen, 2012; Ryan, Althoff,
Whitlow, & Cohen, 2000). In contrast, for the location selection task, we
expected only the intuitive group to show above chance performance.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Participants
Sixty-four university students (23.4 (mean)64.5 (SD) years old; 52
women) took part either for course credit or for 25 e. They were naïve
to the purpose of the experiment and to subliminal stimulation. There-
fore, only semi-informed consent was obtained before experimenta-
tion, but a full debriefing followed experimentation. The experiment
was approved by the local ethics committee. We recruited and
assigned participants to one of two experimental groups after they had
filled out the online PID (Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scales;
Betsch, 2004). Recruitment was continued until 32 participants were
assigned to the deliberative decision maker’s group and 32 to the intui-
tive decision maker’s group. A total of six participants were excluded
due to technical problems (eye tracking or experimental stimulus pre-
sentation); they were replaced.
2.2 | Experimental design
The experiment started with a practice run. Four experimental runs fol-
lowed, each containing a new scene and new objects. The experiment
ended with the two awareness tests and debriefing.
An experimental run always started with two preparation tasks to
familiarize participants with the 3D-scene. Scenes featured large rooms
with paintings, windows, doors, or plants at the walls, which acted as
orientation cues, and contained a large platform with four elevated
positions in the middle of the room. Then an attention task followed,
where subliminal encoding of the objects in scene took place. The
objects were presented at specified positions on the platform. Two
objects were located at these positions in an encoding trial, but the
location memory of only one object was later tested. After a short
break (3 min consolidation period), the experimental run ended with
the implicit retrieval tests (free view and forced choice task), where the
location memory of the previously presented objects was tested
(Figure 1).
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Each of the four experimental runs included six subliminal encod-
ing and retrieval trials (524 trials in total). The four runs corresponded
to the four rotation conditions (i.e., perspective change, in degrees, dur-
ing retrieval): 08, 908, 1808, and 2708. Hence, a given rotation angle was
maintained throughout the six retrieval trials of a run. Scenes were also
maintained throughout the trials of a run/rotation condition. At encod-
ing, all scenes were presented at the default rotation angle of 08. For
retrieval testing, scenes were rotated by 08 (unchanged perspective),
908, 1808, or 2708 according to condition. Scenes were counterbal-
anced over rotation conditions across participants. Objects were trial-
unique, that is, unambiguously associated with a given location in a
given scene.
2.3 | Procedure
Preparation for each run: To familiarize participants with the layout of
the scenes in advance of subliminal object-in-space encoding, partici-
pants watched a video of the upcoming scene, slowly rotating around
its central axis. The video revealed all the landmarks in the periphery of
the scene and participants were instructed to remember these orienta-
tion cues (landmarks), and memory for these orientation cues was
tested afterward. This procedure ensured that participants had a suffi-
cient mental representation of the scene and its landmarks from differ-
ent viewing angles. The next training procedure was used to establish a
task-set—i.e., a computational routine for subliminal encoding (Kiefer &
Martens, 2010; Reber & Henke, 2011). Participants needed to remem-
ber the position of two abstract figures presented at the four elevated
positions at the center of the scene from different viewing angles (08,
908, 1808, and 2708), as in the later experimental task. These two pre-
paratory tasks were conducted in advance of each experimental run
because each run featured a distinct room, which participants needed
to acquire a mental representation of.
Subliminal encoding: The masking procedure followed an estab-
lished protocol (Reber et al., 2012; see Supporting Information). Partici-
pants were kept ignorant of subliminal images. During subliminal
encoding, participants engaged in an attention task that required them
to focus gaze on a fixation cross located at the screen center. This fixa-
tion cross was periodically presented between pattern masks and
FIGURE 1 Experimental design. Upper half: Displayed is one example of a subliminal encoding trial and its corresponding retrieval trial.
Each experimental run consisted of 6 consecutive encoding trials, a consolidation period of 3 min, and the corresponding 6 consecutive
retrieval trials. Scenes were rotated between encoding and retrieval (08, 908, 1808, or 2708) with a constant rotation angle per run.
Displayed is a 908-rotation. For subliminal encoding, a scene with two central objects was presented for 17 ms, flanked by pattern masks, in
12 repetitions in a time window of 6 s. Participants performed an attention task during subliminal encoding, which required them to fixate
the center of the screen and to indicate the orientation of a line segment. There were two indirect retrieval tests of object–location associa-
tions. For the first test, a single object cue was presented subliminally (12 repetitions) to trigger the reactivation of object–location associa-
tions. Then, the scene came up visibly (“free view”), absent the objects, with the two previously occupied locations highlighted. Participants
viewed the scene over 6 s for eye movement measurements. For the second (“forced-choice”) test, the same object cue was presented visi-
bly below the scene to trigger the reactivation of object–location associations. Participants indicated which highlighted location was a better
fit for that object. Lower half: Illustration of scene rotation between subliminal encoding and implicit retrieval tasks. Scene perspective dur-
ing subliminal encoding was always constant (08 rotation). For the implicit retrieval tasks, perspective on the scene could remain the same
as during encoding (08) or rotate for 908, 1808, or 2708. This perspective was held constant throughout the six retrieval trials for a given
scene [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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subliminal stimuli. It switched to a line segment in a subset of trials.
Participants were instructed to indicate the orientation of the line seg-
ment by button press. The six subliminal encoding trials of an experi-
mental run contained the scene, which participants had been
familiarized to, including two objects that were located on demarcated
positions near the center of the room. A subliminal encoding trial con-
sisted of twelve 17 ms flashes of a particular object-in-scene configura-
tion. After the six subliminal encoding trials, participants rested 3 min
before retrieval testing followed.
Unconscious retrieval: The six encoding trials resulted in six
retrieval trials. Each retrieval trial consisted of two implicit retrieval pro-
cedures: the first procedure was a gaze-based unintentional retrieval
test and the second was an intentional forced-choice test requiring vol-
untary button-press responses. For both implicit retrieval tests, the
scene was presented supraliminally with two (of four) locations high-
lighted. These were the positions occupied by the two objects in a
given encoding trial. Location knowledge of only one of the two encod-
ing objects was tested. For the gaze-based test, the object in question
was flashed subliminally (12 repetitions) as an implicit retrieval cue just
before the scene was presented. Participants were instructed to simply
view the scene for 6 s. No additional instructions were given and no
emphasis was put on viewing the highlighted locations. We hypothe-
sized that the subliminal object cue would trigger an unconscious reac-
tivation of object-in-space associations, which in turn would direct
gaze to the location that had previously been occupied by the object.
The forced-choice test followed. At this point, the scene with the two
highlighted locations remained on the screen with the object cue visibly
displayed below the scene. Participants were instructed to spontane-
ously place the object where it fits better. Unconscious location mem-
ory was expected to bias choices to the location where that object was
previously presented during subliminal encoding.
Awareness test: Following the experiment, we conducted two
forced-choice tests that measured stimulus awareness to validate the
subliminal nature of stimulus presentations. The first test was an
awareness test for scenes to validate subliminal presentations in the
encoding part of the experiment. The second test was an awareness
test for single objects to validate subliminal object presentations in the
retrieval part of the experiment. This sequence of tests was strictly
maintained. Both tests contained 24 trials each and followed a trial-by-
trial procedure with subliminal encoding immediately followed by the
respective forced-choice test. Subliminal encoding protocols and num-
ber of stimulus presentations were exactly the same as in the main
experiment. In the awareness test for scenes, participants were
instructed to identify the two objects and their locations within a sub-
liminal encoding trial. Then the scene was shown supraliminally, with
the two locations highlighted, and one object was presented below the
scene. Participants had to decide on which location the object had
been presented subliminally. For this awareness test, four new scenes
were used with six new object pairs each, and no perspective change
occurred between encoding and retrieval. The awareness test for single
objects consisted of single objects instead of scenes. Participants were
instructed to identify the presented object within a subliminal encoding
trial. Then two objects were shown supraliminally, and participants had
to decide which of the two objects had been presented before. Target
objects in this awareness test stemmed from the experiment; they con-
sisted of the subliminally encoded but then not retrieval-tested objects.
The foil objects were new, that is, not used in the experiment.
2.4 | Stimuli and counterbalancing
Scenes were rendered colored images of 3D-models of nine distinct
rooms (four rooms for the experiment, four rooms for the awareness
test, and one room for practice trials). Scenes were limited by four
sides. Each side was demarcated by at least two landmarks. Scene cen-
ters were equipped with a grey platform, on top of which four white
elevated positions marked the four spots where encoding objects could
be located. To equip rooms with objects for object-in-space encoding,
we selected 136 distinct and easily recognizable images of common
objects. One room and 16 objects were used for practice trials, four
rooms and 48 objects were used for the experiment, another four
rooms and 48 objects were used in the awareness test for scenes, and
24 objects were used as foils in the awareness test for single objects.
Objects were randomly assigned to rooms, randomly paired and
assigned to trials, and randomly assigned to positions in a room. Each
of the four possible positions was occupied twice by an object across
trials. Rendered images of scenes served as subliminal encoding stimuli
and objects rendered without a background served as subliminal
retrieval cues and as subliminal targets in the object awareness test.
We counterbalanced the following over participants: The two sets of
four rooms were counterbalanced between the experiment and the
awareness test, retention testing was done for each of the two objects
presented in a subliminal room an equal number of times, and positions
of objects in rooms were swapped such that a specific object location
was correct for only half of participants. Moreover, the order of rooms
and the order of rotation conditions (runs) were distributed over partic-
ipants according to a 4 3 4 Latin square. This procedure resulted in 32
experimental schemes; 32 was the number of participants in the delib-
erative decision makers’ group and the intuitive decision makers’ group.
2.5 | Apparatus
We recorded binocular eye tracking data at 250 Hz with a head
mounted video-based eye tracker (Eyelink II system, SR Research) using
a chinrest to avoid extensive head movement. Stimuli were presented
on a screen at a distance of 120 cm using a DLP projector (60 Hz
refresh rate) in a darkened laboratory. Subliminal stimuli had a resolu-
tion of 680 3 510 pixels and spanned a visual angle of 178 width and
12.758 height. Stimulus presentation and response logging were
programmed with the Experiment Builder software (SR Research).
Responses were logged using a software compatible Microsoft USB
Sidewinder gamepad.
2.6 | Eye movement calibration and data analysis
A nine-point calibration procedure was performed prior to each experi-
mental run. A short drift correction was performed after subliminal cue-
ing at the beginning of each retrieval trial. Eye movement data were
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analyzed using the Data Viewer software (SR Research). Fixations were
all those events that were not classified as saccades (detection thresh-
olds: 0.158 motion, 308/s velocity, and 8,0008/s2) or blinks (missing
pupil). Regions of interest were the surface of the two highlighted loca-
tions in the test scene. A highlighted location subtended a visual angle
between 2.158 and 3.58 horizontally and 0.858 and 2.68 vertically. Pro-
portion of dwell time on the cued and uncued location was analyzed
over the time course of 6 s because time course analyses reveal more
detailed information about memory-related eye movement effects
(Hannula et al., 2007). Eye movement data was segmented into time
bins of 250 ms. Total fixation time was computed per time bin (i.e., fix-
ations on the stimulus display with blinks and saccades removed). Pro-
portion of dwell time was the time spent fixating the cued or uncued
location divided by total fixation time per time bin.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Early disproportionate viewing
of the uncued location
To find out whether participants’ gaze would linger longer on the cued
than the uncued object location during the free viewing time window
of 6 s, we computed a between-subjects repeated-measures ANOVA.
The within-subjects factors were location (cued/uncued) and rotation
angle (08/908/1808/2708) and the between-subjects factor was deci-
sion style (intuitive/deliberative). The ANOVA was computed for the
time window of 500–750 ms following display onset because this was
the time window in which first disproportionate viewing effects due to
memory have been reported (Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula
et al., 2007). There was a main effect of location (F(1,62)57.2,
p5 .009, h2p 50.1) with a longer dwell time on the uncued than the
cued location (cued location: M 5 8.43%, SE50.62%; uncued location:
M 5 10.45%, SE50.87%). There were no significant results for rota-
tion angle, decision style, or any interactions between factors (all
p> .63). To test whether this viewing difference was maintained over
the whole time window of 6 s, we computed the above ANOVA with
the additional within-subjects factor time (6 s in 250 ms levels). A main
effect of time (F(8,494)556.2, p< .001, h2p 50.48) emerged but nei-
ther a main effect of location (F(1,62)50.08, p5 .78, h2p 50.01) nor
any other significant effect (all p> .14). We conclude that differential
viewing behavior appeared following display onset and vanished there-
after (Figure 2a). Further analyses revealed that this early differential
viewing pattern was caused by the first fixation made after display
onset: an ANOVA comparing the proportion of trials in which the first
fixation was directed to either the cued or the uncued location con-
firmed that there was a significantly larger proportion of trials where
the fixation was directed to the uncued location: F(1,62)510.8,
p5 .002, h2p 50.15; Mcued513.5%, SEcued51.01%, Muncued517.9%,
SEuncued51.14%). There were no significant differences for the factors
rotation angle (p5 .98) or group (all p5 .68) nor for the interactions (all
p> .14; descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1). Therefore, partici-
pants generally tended to spontaneously fixate the uncued location
after stimulus onset.
3.2 | Intuitive decision makers chose
object-cued location
Following the free viewing time window, the object cue was presented
supraliminally underneath the scene for participants to spontaneously
decide which of the two highlighted locations in the scene the
FIGURE 2 Results. (a) Proportion of viewing time directed to the cued or uncued location during the 6 s free viewing time window. More
time was spent looking at the uncued location between 500 and 750 ms following scene onset. (b) Accuracy scores in the forced-choice
object placement task. Intuitive decision makers performed above chance level. (c) Accuracy scores (weighted means) plotted per first fixa-
tion condition. In retrieval trials where the first fixation during the free viewing time window went to the uncued object location, partici-
pants tended to select the correct location for the object cue later on; this effect reached statistical significance for intuitive decision
makers only; this result was not influenced by rotation condition. *p< .05, one-tailed; **p< .01, two-tailed. Error bars represent standard
errors of means
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presented object fits better to. We computed a repeated-measures
ANOVA with the within-subjects factor rotation angle (08, 908, 1808,
and 2708) and the between-subjects factor decision style (intuitive or
deliberative) to test the hypothesis derived from the outcome of the
pilot experiment (Supporting Information) that intuitive decision makers
choose the correct object location. This ANOVA yielded no significant
differences (all p> .32; descriptive statistics in Table 2). Next, we tested
directly whether the group of intuitive decision makers would perform
above chance level given the finding of the pilot experiment indicating
that intuitive decision makers tend to choose the correct object loca-
tion. This pattern of results was indeed replicated: the intuitive decision
makers’ performance (M552.6%, SE51.33%) exceeded chance level
(t(31)51.95, p5 .03 one-tailed, dz50.35) (Figure 2b). Because the
associated effect size of dz50.35 was smaller than the effect size
obtained in the previous pilot experiment (d50.43), we added Bayes-
ian statistics to evaluate the probability that the current effect size
speaks for the null hypothesis. Bayes factors (i.e., the ratio of the likeli-
hood of the data given one or the other hypothesis) are useful in deter-
mining the sensitivity with which obtained data distinguish between
two hypotheses. Bayes statistics inform us whether the data support
one over the other hypothesis, or are simply uninformative (Dienes,
2014). Here, we compared the relative evidence for the hypothesis
that the group of intuitive decision makers yielded an effect of sublimi-
nal memory formation comparable to the effect obtained in the previ-
ous pilot experiment (4.2% correct choices above chance level) versus
the hypothesis that this group performed at chance level (0%). Follow-
ing the recommendations by Dienes (2014), we chose a half-normal
prior distribution with a mode of 0 and a standard deviation of 4.2% to
compute the Bayes factor. The resulting Bayes factor was 3.32.
According to conventions regarding the interpretation of the Bayes fac-
tor, values below 1/3 indicate substantial support for H0, while values
>3 indicate substantial support for H1 (Jeffreys, 1939). Therefore, our
current data clearly reject the H0 of chance performance and favor the
hypothesis that the obtained effect size was comparable to the pilot
study’s effect size.
There were no significant differences between rotation conditions:
F(3,93)50.22, p5 .88, h2p 50.01, suggesting that the overall effect
was not driven solely by the 08 condition.
The group of deliberative decision makers chose the correct object
location with an overall accuracy of 50.4% (1.78), which is chance level
(see Table 2 for complete descriptive statistics).
3.3 | Disproportionate viewing was related
to choice behavior
As reported above, early eye movements during the free viewing task
were disproportionately directed to the uncued (rather than the cued)
scene location. If this effect indeed reflected unconscious object-
location knowledge, it should directly relate to the choices of correct
object locations in the group of intuitive decision makers. We predicted
that correct location choices would occur in retrieval trials where first
fixations were directed to uncued locations but not in trials with first
fixations to cued locations or other locations. To test this prediction,
we sorted the 24 trials of the experiment into three fixation conditions:
(1) first fixation to cued location (M#trials 5 3.16), (2) to uncued location
(M#trials 5 4.22), and (3) to any other location (M#trials 5 16.62). The
dependent variable was percentage of correct location choices in each
condition. To account for unequal numbers of trials per condition
(depending on a participant’s viewing behavior), we weighted (multi-
plied) the dependent variable “percentage of cued location choices” by
(with) each participant’s relative number of trials in a fixation condition
(i.e., #trialsparticipant/M#trialsgroup). This procedure accounts for the fact
that some participants made only few fixations and others many fixa-
tions in a fixation condition and should therefore carry less or more
weight in the analysis of cued location choices. The analyses confirmed
that trials with the first fixation directed to the uncued location were
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics for target of first fixation during free view task
Group Location 08 908 1808 2708 Total
Intuitive Cued 14.1 (2.81) 13.0 (2.77) 12.0 (2.92) 13.5 (2.17) 13.2 (1.36)
Uncued 17.7 (2.69) 14.1 (2.6) 20.3 (3.06) 18.2 (2.74) 17.6 (1.63)
Deliberative Cued 12.5 (2.12) 15.6 (2.99) 16.1 (3.22) 11.5 (2.3) 13.9 (1.52)
Uncued 20.3 (2.56) 19.8 (2.3) 13.5 (2.3) 19.3 (2.6) 18.2 (1.62)
Note. Mean percentage of trials where the target of first fixation was the cued or the uncued location. Standard error in parenthesis. 08, 908, 1808,
27085 rotation conditions. Total5 overall score.
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics object placement task
Group N 08 908 1808 2708 Total
Intuitive 32 52.6 (3.67) 54.7 (3.2) 50.5 (3.13) 52.6 (3.67) 52.6 (1.33)
Deliberative 32 47.4 (3.52) 54.7 (4.05) 48.4 (2.93) 51.0 (3.88) 50.4 (1.78)
Note. N5number of participants; 08, 908, 1808, 27085 rotation conditions.
Standard error in parenthesis.
Mean correct placements in percent.
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indeed associated with a higher percentage of correct location choices
(M562.2%, SE54.06%) within the group of intuitive decision makers:
t(31)53.01, p5 .005, dz50.53 (Figure 2c). In contrast, in trials with
the first fixation directed to the cued location, cued location choices
(M553.5%, SE54.4%) did not significantly differ from chance level: t
(29)50.79, p5 .44, dz50.14, nor did they in trials with the first fixa-
tion directed to other locations: M550%, SE51.7%, t(31)50, p51,
dz50. Importantly, when this analysis was computed without weighing
of the means, it yielded the same results: first fixation directed to the
uncued location (M566.3%, SE54.5%): t(31)53.59, p5 .001,
dz50.64; first fixation directed to the cued location (M556.8%,
SE55.7%): t(29)51.2, p5 .24, dz50.22; first fixation directed to
other locations: M550.2%, SE51.8%, t(31)50, p50.9, dz50.02.
Because the group of deliberative decision makers did not show
evidence of unconscious learning in the location selections, we did not
expect this group’s location selections to be better than chance in trials
with first fixations to uncued locations. The corresponding analyses
computed for the group of deliberative decision makers revealed non-
significant results (all p>0.19) (Figure 2c).
3.4 | Awareness tests
Following the experiment, we conducted two directly instructed
forced-choice tests to validate objectively the subliminal nature of pre-
sentations. Accuracy in the scene test was not better than chance, nei-
ther for the group of intuitive decision makers (M550.0%, SE52.1%, t
(31)50.0, p51) nor for the group of deliberative decision makers
(M551.6%, SE51.58%, t(31)50.99, p5 .33). Also, neither group per-
formed better than chance in the object test (intuitive group:
M547.8%, SE51.8%, t(31)521.23, p5 .23; deliberative group:
M546.9%, SE51.69%, t(31)521.85, p5 .08). There were no signifi-
cant performance differences between the intuitive and the deliberative
decision makers in the two awareness tests (t(62)520.59 and t(62)5
0.37, both p > .55). Next, we tested whether the intuitive decision mak-
ers’ performance in the awareness test would predict their choices of
cued locations in the experiment (Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995).
This was not the case, neither for performance in the scene awareness
test (b52.025, t(30)52.14, p5 .89) nor for performance in the
object awareness test (b52.025, t(30)52.14, p5 .89). Importantly,
intercepts in both regressions were significantly larger than zero (scene
test: y-axis intercept5 .026, t(30)51.85, p5 .04; object test: y-axis
intercept5 .026, t(30)51.92, p5 .03) indicating that forced-choice
performance in the experiment remained above chance, when perform-
ance in the awareness tests was regressed to zero.
Because this regression method has been criticized recently for its
lack of sensitivity (Sand & Nilsson, 2016; Shanks, 2017) and because a
nonsignificant result in significance testing does not allow concluding
that the null hypothesis is true, we added Bayesian statistics to help
decide whether the data favor the null hypothesis (H0) of zero aware-
ness over the alternative hypothesis (H1) of residual awareness. We
compared the relative evidence for the hypothesis that the intuitive
participants could not consciously perceive subliminal stimuli in the
awareness tests and performed at chance level versus the evidence for
the hypothesis that the intuitive participants showed a similar perform-
ance in the awareness tests as in the experiment (2.6% above chance
level). We chose a half-normal prior distribution with a mode of 0 and
a standard deviation of 2.6% to calculate the Bayes factor. The result-
ing Bayes factor was 0.63 for the scene test and 0.29 for the object
test. Hence, both Bayes factors favored the hypothesis of zero aware-
ness over residual awareness. The Bayes factor for the data of the
object test is considered substantial according to conventions regarding
the interpretation of the Bayes factor. These additional analyses cor-
roborate the hypothesis that subliminal stimuli were truly masked from
conscious perception.
4 | DISCUSSION
We tested the long-held view that conscious awareness of an encoding
situation is necessary for human episodic memory formation (Gabrieli,
1998; Graf & Schacter, 1985; Moscovitch, 1995, 2008; Schacter, 1998;
Squire & Dede, 2015; Tulving, 2002). This view is based on the results
from encoding protocols that used stimulus materials available to con-
scious perception. Here, we tested whether human subjects encoded
objects in scenes presented below the threshold of conscious percep-
tion. Scenes were rotated between subliminal encoding and supralimi-
nal testing to assess the representational flexibility of unconsciously
formed object–location associations. The encoding test interval
spanned 3 min requiring long-term storage. To test for subliminally
formed object-location memories, we recorded eye movements as an
automatic, unintentional behavior, and manual button-presses as an
intentional behavior. Data revealed that both measures reflected a suc-
cessful subliminal encoding and flexible representation of object–loca-
tion associations: Both the group of intuitive and the group of
deliberative decision makers contributed to a disproportionate viewing
effect reflecting object–location memory. Intentional forced-choices
were indicative of object–location memory in the group of intuitive
decision makers only. Performance on the intentional and the uninten-
tional memory test was correlated for intuitive decision makers only.
This correlation bolsters the validity of the two procedures as tests of
unconscious object-in-space memory. During experimentation, partici-
pants were left naive regarding the purpose of the experiment and
regarding subliminal stimulus presentations. They were fully debriefed
following the experiment. The validity of the applied masking technique
was confirmed by the results of two objective awareness tests carried
out at the end of the testing session. These tests indicated that both
deliberative and intuitive decision makers were completely unable to
discriminate the subliminal stimuli.
The eye movement effect unfolded early in accordance with previ-
ous findings (e.g. Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula et al., 2007)
and was restricted to the first fixation after display onset. The rapid dis-
sipation of the eye movement effect underscores past observations
that unconscious memories may not affect viewing patterns beyond
the first saccade (Huang, Tan, Soon, & Hsieh, 2014). We had flashed
subliminal object cues to reactivate memories of where in scenes
objects were located and had expected a disproportionate viewing of
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object-cued locations. Yet, participants tended to direct their first fixa-
tion to uncued rather than cued locations. One might suspect that this
effect was driven by a change in perspective during encoding and
retrieval in the rotated conditions, that is, by an activation of an ego-
centric rather than an allocentric frame of reference. However, data do
not support such a notion because there was no interaction with rota-
tion condition and because uncued locations were also preferred in the
08 condition, where the viewer’s perspective remained stable from
encoding to test. Rather, we assume that subliminal object cues had
reactivated allocentric object–location representations, which in turn
elicited correct expectations about which scene location would be
highlighted. We further assume that viewers’ gaze was attracted by the
surprise highlighting of an additional location, namely, the uncued loca-
tion. This surprise effect is reminiscent of the preference for novelty
(longer viewing of new vs old item) that serves as a powerful indicator
of long-term memory in nonverbal human infants and experimental ani-
mals (Snyder, Blank, & Marsolek, 2008). Novelty preference has been
found to reflect item memory and item–location associations (Hannula
et al., 2010a; Hannula et al., 2010b; Ryan et al., 2000). However, other
explanations are also conceivable. For example, a successful reactiva-
tion of the object–location representation during the 6 s of subliminal
cueing could have directed eye movements to the correct location
already prior to scene onset, so that viewing of the uncued location
would reflect relative novelty or an inhibition-of-return effect (Posner,
Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1985). Within the light of the current data,
these explanations remain speculative. But the interpretation of dispro-
portionate viewing as an expression of a flexible object–location repre-
sentation is supported by the intuitive decision makers’ tendency to
choose the object-cued location in the second implicit test in those tri-
als, where they viewed the uncued location in the first implicit test.
Hence, the two implicit measures, eye movements and location selec-
tions, were related: only trials where the first eye fixation was drawn to
the unexpectedly highlighted uncued location resulted in an above-
chance selection of the correct object location by the intuitive group.
Retrieval success in both implicit tests seemed equal between
rotated and unrotated perspectives. The obtained overall effects did not
depend on a certain rotation condition. Hence, these findings speak for
the hypothesis of the build-up of flexible, view-independent (i.e., allocen-
tric) object-in-space representations from subliminal images (Bird & Bur-
gess, 2008; King, Burgess, Hartley, Vargha-Khadem, & O’Keefe, 2002).
Yet, this result needs to be taken with caution because each rotation
condition included only 6 trials. This low number of trials increased error
variance in conditions such that performance in none of the rotation con-
ditions reached significance by itself. Also, the small number of trials did
not allow for reliable comparisons between the individual rotation condi-
tions. With few trial numbers, it could happen that the easy condition,
the 08 condition with no perspective change from encoding to test, drove
the effects. The data (Table 2) speak against this possibility because the
intuitive decision makers’ performance on the object placement task was
nominally equal between the 08 and the rotated conditions (52.6%).
Moreover, when the 08 condition was excluded and only the three
rotated conditions were evaluated, the first-fixation effect and the
correlation between the two measures of memory still yielded signifi-
cance for the group of intuitive decision makers (both p5 .02).
The question arises of whether unconscious spatial processing
would differ between the 08 and the rotated conditions analogous to
the known susceptibility of conscious spatial processing to increasing
viewpoint shifts (e.g., King et al., 2002). When spatial processing is con-
scious, shifts of imagined viewpoints usually show a chronometrical rela-
tionship with the size of the shifted viewpoint. Viewpoint shifts reflect an
iterative mental manipulation of the shifted viewpoint towards the
encoding viewpoint (Diwadkar & McNamara, 1997; King et al., 2002).
The hippocampus appears critical for such viewpoint shifts as it helps
translating allocentric into egocentric representations (Bird & Burgess,
2008). Reaction time data of the current experiment are suggestive of
viewpoint shifts: Correct responses in the object placement task took sig-
nificantly longer in rotated conditions than the 08 condition (08:M51946
ms, SE5106.1 ms; 908: M52326 ms, SE5149.6 ms; 1808: M52159
ms, SE5128.1 ms; 2708:M52158 ms, SE5153 ms; repeated measures
ANOVA: F(2.04,124.9)50.22, p5 .04, h2p 50.05; quadratic polynomial
contrast p5 .02). Hence, additional processing was also required with a
subliminal encoding protocol and this additional processing may reflect
unconscious viewpoint shifts. These results are consistent with the con-
struction of cognitive maps (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978) and the construction
of coherent scenes (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence of unconscious object-in-
space encoding and flexible retrieval from long-term memory. The use of
3D-environments, which were rotated between study and test, allowed us
to bring unconscious relational learning (Duss et al., 2011; T. P. Reber &
Henke, 2011) to the spatial domain. The spatial domain is a key to episodic
memory according to the original definition: episodic memory is the mem-
ory of when and where things happened in the personal past (Tulving,
1972). Although brain activity was not measured in this experiment, chan-
ces are high that the hippocampus was supporting the unconscious encod-
ing and reactivation of object-in-space associations because the task
requires rapid spatial relational encoding and flexible retrieval—key aspects
of hippocampal memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Henke, 2010;
McClelland et al., 1995; Moses & Ryan, 2006; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003;
O’Reilly & Rudy, 2000; Treves & Rolls, 1994). There is much empirical evi-
dence that the hippocampus is necessary to store associations of items
and their contexts (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Howard,
Kumaran, Olafsdottir, & Spiers, 2011; Libby, Hannula, & Ranganath,
2014). Theories emphasizing the role of the hippocampus in spatial proc-
essing posit that the hippocampus serves as a cognitive map of our envi-
ronment (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978) and the mental construction of spatially
coherent scenes (Bird & Burgess, 2008; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). The
hippocampus appears to play a quite generic role in object location mem-
ory including short-term memory (Crane & Milner, 2005; Esfahani-Bayerl
et al., 2016; Olson, 2006; Watson, Voss, Warren, Tranel, & Cohen, 2013;
Yee, Hannula, Tranel, & Cohen, 2014; but see Allen, Vargha-Khadem, &
Baddeley, 2014; Jeneson, Mauldin, Hopkins, & Squire, 2011) and perhaps
also including unconscious memory as examined here. It appears to be
particularly the internal reconstruction of correct object locations—as
examined in this study—that drives the hippocampus (Stepankova, Fenton,
Pastalkova, Kalina, & Bohbot, 2004; Watson et al., 2013) and allocentric
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spatial processing in general (Hartley et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2005). Given
the similarity of cognitive processes investigated in these supraliminal
experiments and the subliminal experiment introduced here, it is likely that
the hippocampus was also at work during unconscious object-in-space
association formation and reactivation, as examined here.
Based on previous results (Hannula et al., 2010a, 2012; Ryan et al.,
2000) and the results of the pilot experiment (Supporting Information),
we had hypothesized that intentional deliberation would affect deci-
sion performance negatively in the object placement task, where
implicit memory and hence intuition should guide decisions (for similar
findings see Voss & Paller, 2010). Findings from both the pilot experi-
ment and the main experiment corroborate the hypothesis that uncon-
scious memory can guide intentional location choices, if participants
habitually prefer intuitive decision making over deliberation. On the
other hand, both intuitive and deliberative decision makers expressed
flexible object-location knowledge in their eye movements. We assume
that decision making is not an issue when simply viewing a scene
(5first implicit memory test) because eyes are usually moving sponta-
neously. Therefore, eye movements may be a more direct and purer
measure of implicit memory than intentional choices. It should be
noted that group differences between intuitive and deliberative partici-
pants were not statistically significant in the experiment. This lack of a
group difference was probably not due to a lack of validity or discrimi-
native power of the personality inventory because the inventory-based
classifications matched the impressions of participants: intuitive deci-
sion makers (vs deliberative decision makers) reported in a postexperi-
mental survey that they felt more at ease with the decision task (10-
point Likert scale; Mdnintuitive: 3; Mdndeliberative: 3; U5376, Z521.92,
p5 .027, one-tailed, r52.24) and that they had decided more intui-
tively than deliberatively (Mdnintuitive: 3.5; Mdndeliberative: 4; U5378.5,
Z521.82, p5 .035, one-tailed, r52.23). These personal reports were
not influenced by knowledge of group membership. However, neither
preference for intuition according to the Betsch inventory nor self-
reported use of intuition during the object placement task correlated
with placement accuracy: r(62)5 .07, p5 .61 and r(62)5 .08, p5 .55,
respectively. This lack of significant correlations plus the lack of signifi-
cant group differences regarding performance accuracy in the object
placement task suggests that the superiority of intuition over delibera-
tion was marginal.
In conclusion, the current findings show that completely uncon-
scious scene perception allows for scene segmentation (background;
objects) and for the formation of unconscious object-in-space associa-
tions that are stored flexibly in long-term memory. The speed of associ-
ation formation and the flexibility of their long-term representation are
key computational aspects of episodic memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum,
1993; Henke, 2010; McClelland et al., 1995; Moses & Ryan, 2006;
Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; O’Reilly & Rudy, 2000; Treves & Rolls,
1994). Hence, according to computational definitions of episodic mem-
ory, the current findings suggest an unconscious form of spatial epi-
sodic memory. But this result challenges long-held views assuming that
conscious awareness of the encoding situation is mandatory for epi-
sodic memory formation (Gabrieli, 1998; Graf & Schacter, 1985; Mos-
covitch, 1995, 2008; Schacter, 1998; Squire & Dede, 2015; Tulving,
2002), while supporting the view that consciousness is not mandatory
for episodic memory (Henke, 2010; Reder, Park, & Kieffaber, 2009).
When considering that rapid and flexible spatial association formation
is an evolutionarily old asset required for survival (Manns & Eichen-
baum, 2006), it is little surprising that this cognitive processing works
at various levels of consciousness.
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